Steakhouse Ethena USDtb (Ethereum) Risk

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 13% of deposit

Driven by sUSDe −30% 13% · USDe −30% <1% · −100% 56% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

sUSDeHybrid56%of vault · bad debt · $997,071.05Oracle exposure 44%

100%of vault · $1.79m56%of vault · $997,071.0544%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid(exchange-rate)

sUSDe is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (ERC4626 vault share-rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.

BaseERC4626 vault share-rateVault

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDtb92% LLTV0x67bc…db89

Room to grow: $1.79m of $199.98m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$322.07m76 vaultsToken:0x9d39…3497Allocation: 100% of the vault · $1.79m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 13% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $1.79m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 44% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

USDeHybrid<0.1%of vault · bad debt · $7.03Oracle exposure <0.1%

<0.1%of vault · $11.22<0.1%of vault · $7.03<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid(constant)

USDe uses a constant oracle path; verified external provider(s): no verified external provider.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDtb92% LLTV0xae47…ca35

Room to grow: $11.22 of $199.98m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$274.57m54 vaultsToken:0x4c9e…68b3Allocation: <0.1% of the vault · $11.22

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $11.22 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

Oracle dependencies

Up to44%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $794,896.35

Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

On-chain exchange rate· no external feed or adminprices sUSDe, USDe44% of vault · $794,896.35mispriceable only via the issuing contract

Loss scenarios

Each row is a distinct failure, and every loss is a share of your deposit — the same percentage whatever you deposited. Loss is that share at a −30% collateral crash, the standard stress; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong, a conditional loss if it happens rather than a likelihood. Open a row for the loss at every crash depth, the dollar amounts, conditions, and the math.

12 scenarios · 10 with no time to exit · loss as % of deposit


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	13%	up to 56%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	13%	up to 56%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(5)
	44%	Full deposit	Instant
	13%	up to 56%	Instant
	13%	up to 56%	Instant
	13%	up to 56%	Instant
	—	up to 44%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(4)
	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 56%	Instant
	—	up to 50%	3 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Owner5-of-10 multisig0x0a0e…f8dd

Curator2-of-7 multisig0x827e…ecdb

Guardiancontract0xdc4c…33fa

Allocators6 · 1 multisig · 2 contracts · 3 EOAsReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

single key (EOA)0x7a17…4e8d
single key (EOA)0xfc58…d827
contract0xfd32…c75d
1-of-7 multisig0x0000…9da8
contract0x9e91…f9e1
single key (EOA)0xfeed…3c9a

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

Certora· Dec 15, 2025report
Blackthorn· Dec 4, 2025report
Spearbit· Dec 4, 2025report
Blackthorn· Sep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 voter concentration100.0%

Quorum to pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 2.56m

Voting token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

7 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.