Gauntlet USDC Prime

Risk reportBase0xee8f…4b61

Risk

Depositing into Gauntlet USDC Prime means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

38%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 7-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 17% of deposit

Driven by cbBTC −30% 15% · WETH −30% 1% · cbETH −30% <1% · other <1% · −100% 90% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

cbBTCMarketChainlink83%of vault · bad debt · $347.84mOracle exposure 9%

92%of vault · $386.32m83%of vault · $347.84m9%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

cbBTC is priced via BTC / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseBTC / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0x663b…39b9Chainlink

Room to grow: $386.32m of $749.92m cap (52% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$189.11m64 vaultsToken:0xcbb7…33bfAllocation: 92% of the vault · $386.32m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 15% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $386.32m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 9% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

WETHMarketChainlink6%of vault · bad debt · $25.69mOracle exposure 0.7%

7%of vault · $28.51m6%of vault · $25.69m0.7%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

WETH is priced via ETH / USD, quoted in USDC / USD — 2-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).

BaseETH / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteUSDC / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0xfea2…afe4Chainlink

Room to grow: $28.51m of $99.99m cap (29% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$61.43m50 vaultsToken:0x4200…0006Allocation: 7% of the vault · $28.51m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $28.51m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.7% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbETHMarketChainlink1.0%of vault · bad debt · $4.2mOracle exposure 0.1%

1%of vault · $4.66m1.0%of vault · $4.2m0.1%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

cbETH is priced via CBETH / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseCBETH / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 3

→ USDC86% LLTV0x4756…9425Chainlink
→ USDC86% LLTV0xb40d…cd96Chainlink
→ USDC77% LLTV0x97ff…8295Chainlink

Room to grow: $4.66m of $299.97m cap (2% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$75.24m59 vaultsToken:0x2ae3…ec22Allocation: 1% of the vault · $4.66m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.1% of depositUses 3 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $4.66m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

wstETHMarketChainlink0.1%of vault · bad debt · $616,879.47Oracle exposure <0.1%

0.2%of vault · $684,699.560.1%of vault · $616,879.47<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

wstETH is priced via WSTETH / ETH × ETH / USD, quoted in USDC / USD — 3-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).

BaseWSTETH / ETHMarketChainlinkETH / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteUSDC / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 2

→ USDC86% LLTV0x957e…ce5fChainlink
→ USDC86% LLTV0xd7a1…289aChainlink

Room to grow: $684,699.56 of $10m cap (7% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$51.23m50 vaultsToken:0xc1cb…e452Allocation: 0.2% of the vault · $684,699.56

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 2 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $684,699.56 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

Oracle dependencies

1 feed · 1 control point

Up to10%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $41.83m

Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices wstETH, WETH, cbBTC, cbETH0xf0db…5b1b10% of vault · $41.83mdrainable if it is compromised


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	17%	up to 90%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	17%	up to 90%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(6)
	17%	up to 90%	Instant
	17%	up to 90%	Instant
	17%	up to 90%	Instant
	—	up to 10%	Instant
	<1%	up to <1%	Instant
	<1%	up to <1%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(4)
	—	Full deposit	7 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	7 days
	—	0%	Instant

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 7 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Owner4-of-7 multisig0x5a4e…d4d0

Curator3-of-7 multisig0x9e33…0585

Guardian3-of-7 multisig0x7084…84cd

Allocators2 · 1 contract · 1 EOAReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

contract0xa090…0467
single key (EOA)0xffd6…119b

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

Certora· Dec 15, 2025report
Blackthorn· Dec 4, 2025report
Spearbit· Dec 4, 2025report
Blackthorn· Sep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 voter concentration100.0%

Quorum to pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 2.56m

Voting token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

10 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated Sep 13, 2026Sources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql

Gauntlet USDC Prime

Risk

Collateral and oracle exposure

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

Oracle dependencies

Loss scenarios

Trust and control

Vault operators

Audits

Governance & control

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

Market Specific oracle